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I. INTRODUCTION
In the early 1970’s, all three branches of Maryland’s government underwent significant
reform and unprecedented expansion. For the first time, African Americans and women were
voted into the House of Delegates and the Senate. The rookie lawmakers of the General
Assembly acknowledged their inexperience and, thus, demanded a robust research and advisory
staff. Under the leadership of Governor Martin Mandel, the executive branch organized its
chaotic mish-mash of 248 regulatory agencies into twelve newly created departments headed by
Secretaries that reported directly to the Governor. The judiciary likewise reorganized and
expanded; a four-tiered judiciary consisting of the Court of Appeals, Court of Special Appeals,
Circuit Courts, and newly created District Courts emerged from an antiquated system that lacked
adequate oversight over local judges. For the first time, Maryland’s judges were provided with
full-time law clerks to take on Maryland’s growing judicial dockets. All three branches of
Maryland’s government expanded at an unprecedented rate, and so did its influence on the lives
of Marylanders.
Government growth sets the stage for a story of its time, Prince George’s County v.
Collington Crossroads (“Collington”). In 1975, thirty years ahead of the Supreme Court’s
controversial Kelo decision, the Court of Appeals of Maryland, in Prince George’s County v.
Collington Crossroads, Inc, upheld the constitutionality of economic development takings in
Maryland. Specifically, the Court of Appeals held that condemning private property for the
development of an industrial park meets “public use” and is thus constitutional. This paper
explores the landmark Collington case from a legal, but also a historical perspective.
The paper begins by mapping Maryland’s eminent domain law as it has evolved by way
of constitutional amendment and judicial interpretation. As you will learn, Maryland’s courts
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historically have interpreted “public use” broadly and have almost always deferred to the
legislature’s eminent domain efforts. The paper next explores the fundamental disagreement
over the correct interpretation of “public use” between a career trial court judge and a young
Appeals judge then recently appointed to the Court of Appeals of Maryland. In these sections,
the political landscape in Maryland, characterized by unprecedented growth in all three branches
of Maryland’s government, is also discussed. By describing the parties, the different judges that
presided over the Collington controversy, and the political landscape of 1970s Maryland, I hope
to give the reader a glimpse of the different forces at play that shaped the landmark Collington
decision.
Against this backdrop, the paper then evaluates whether Prince George’s County (“PG
County”) economic takings land condemnation was successful. Although the industrial park
failed to attract desirable businesses and the media, business leaders, and even Maryland’s
governor unanimously declared the industrial park a failure, this paper argues that PG County
nonetheless benefited from the land condemnation to the extent that it appropriated land that had
since appreciated substantially in value. While only compensating Collington Crossroads, Inc.
$2.5 million for its 323-acre tract of land in 1976, that same tract of land appreciated to
approximately $38 million in 1987. As such, PG County effectively banked on Collington
Crossroads’ real-estate investment.
In conclusion, the paper argues that the Court of Appeals of Maryland, despite the
unfairness of the situation, decided Collington correctly. This is because the takings clause is
comprised of two elements, “public use” and “just compensation.” The former speaks to
legitimacy; the latter speaks to fairness. As the Court of Appeals was only asked to decide
whether economic development constituted “public use,” but not asked to decide “just
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compensation,” the paper concludes that the Court of Appeals correctly decided the Collington
case.
II. HISTORY OF EMINENT DOMAIN IN MARYLAND
A. DUAL NATURE OF MARYLAND’S TAKINGS CLAUSE
Article III Section 40 of Maryland’s Constitution provides:
The General Assembly shall enact no Law authorizing private property, to be
taken for public use, without just compensation, as agreed upon between the
parties, or awarded by a Jury, being first paid or tendered to the party entitled to
such compensation.1
Taking property, therefore, is not unconstitutional so long as the burdened private property
owner is compensated justly for his or her losses. When enacting Maryland’s takings clause, the
framers of Maryland’s Constitution envisioned that the right to private property, although
important, must at times yield to the demands of the public.
B. MARYLAND’S COURTS HAS READ ARTICLE III § 40 “PUBLIC USE” EXPANSIVELY
Curiously, Maryland’s constitutional takings clause, like those of many states and the
federal government, does not expressly prohibit government condemnations of private property
for private use. It only provides that Maryland has the right to condemn land for a public use
when “just compensation” or fair-market value is tendered to the private landowner.2 Article III
Section 40, is silent as to the legitimacy of condemning private property purely to benefit another
private party. That Maryland’s takings clause does not speak to the legitimacy of taking property
for another private individual probably does not stem from oversight of the drafters, but from the
firm conviction that condemning private property purely for the benefit of another private party
is so fundamentally wrong that its prohibition need not be expounded upon in Maryland’s
1

MD. CONST. art III, § 40 (amended 1864).
See generally Chi., Burlington and Quincy R.R. Co. v. Chi., 166 U.S. 226 (1896) (Delivering the opinion of the
court, Justice Harlan states that the owner of private property taken under the right of eminent domain obtains just
compensation if he is awarded the fair and full equivalent for the thing taken from him by the public.)

2
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constitution. This intuition has been confirmed by Maryland’s courts, which have no doubt,
interpreted Article III Section 40 to imply the prohibition of private use takings. In Arnsperger
v. Crawford, Judge Pearce expressed that the “implied prohibition contained in section 40 of Art.
III is too clear to be questioned,” thereby disposing of the notion that private property might be
constitutionally taken for private uses.3 Maryland, therefore, may only condemn private property
for a public use, and then, only when the condemned party is provided with just compensation.
Maryland courts, however, have had difficulty drawing the line that separates public from
private. The line drawn always seems to be a fine one, and to add to the difficulty, it has
changed positions over time. Some courts defend the lack of a bright line rule separating public
from private by arguing that a fixed rule in an ever-changing world would be unwise, if not
futile.4 As such, States have had varying interpretations as to how far “public use” extends
within their jurisdictions. Where to draw the line between private and public is the most hotly
contested issue underlying eminent domain law.
Despite the inherent difficulty in distinguishing public from private, Maryland’s courts no
doubt have taken an expansive view of what constitutes “public use.” The Court, for one, has
made clear that “public use” is not read literally to imply that the government condemnation
must allow for the general public to use or occupy the condemned land. Maryland’s courts, for
example, have upheld government condemnations to benefit private railroad companies on
grounds that railroads facilitate transportation and commerce, and thus, benefit the public at
large. The Court has also made clear that a “use” does not become “private” if the “public use”

3

Arnsperger v. Crawford, 101 Md. 246, 61 A. 413 (1905).
Collington, at 181; see also Riden v. Phila., 182 Md. 336, 340-341; see also N.Y. City Housing Auth. v. Muller,
270 N.Y. 333 (“Over many years and in a multitude of cases the courts have vainly attempted to define
comprehensively the concept of a public use and to formulate a universal test. They have found here as elsewhere
that to formulate anything ultimate, even though it were possible, would, in an inevitably changing world, be unwise
if not futile.”)
4
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incidentally benefits private owners to the detriment of others. On this theory, the Court has
upheld the condemnation of a coal mining property for the construction of a railroad.5
Moreover, the Court has also deemed constitutional the condemnation of private harbor-front
properties for the comprehensive redevelopment of Baltimore’s blighted harbor.6 As case law
makes clear, Maryland courts have always interpreted “public use” expansively.
C. MARYLAND DECLARES SLUM CLEARANCE A “PUBLIC USE”
The domain of Maryland’s “public use” expanded even farther under the current of the
20th century slum clearance movement, America’s easy answer to poverty. In the 1800’s, as
American port cities became centers of industry and commerce, people flocked to urban cities in
search for jobs. However, the supply of labor exceeded the demand for help. As a result, many
of the migrant workers lived in poverty for lack of work or dearth of pay. Shanty communities
sprung up along the outskirts of affluent city centers.7 Neighboring the poor for the first time,
the urban elite grew concerned that their communities might also become impoverished. Urged
by the governing elite, state and local government began clearing poor neighborhoods to make
way for public works such as roads, highways, and railroads. Thus began the discourse of urban
“blight,” a movement that expanded the domain of “public use” considerably.
In the twentieth century, the urban elite’s conviction that slums were public nuisances
that ought to be cleared for beneficial uses grew only stronger. In a nation-wide effort to
eliminate slums, urban renewal advocates created a discourse of blight that armed government
5

See New Cent. Coal Co. v. George’s Creek Coal & Iron Co., 37 Md. 537, 560 (1873) (Upheld government
condemnation of mining company’s property to make possible for a private railroad company to build tracks to
facilitate the transport of coal.); see also Pitznogle v. W. Md. R. R. Co., 119 Md. 673, 678 (1913) (Upheld
condemnation of private road for both the construction of a railroad line and to develop another private road on
which people could travel to and from the railroad.).
6
See Marchant v. Baltimore, 146 Md. 513, 126 (1924)(Upheld constitutionality of condemnation by looking to the
economic benefit that the public would derive from the comprehensive harbor development. The Court found
nothing wrong with government taking public land and, in turn, lease it to private corporations.)
7
See Garrett Power, Deconstructing the Slums of Baltimore, Vol. New Perspectives on Baltimore’s Past, Maryland
Historical Society, 47 (2002).
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with a powerful excuse to condemn private property. Blight, according to them, was a
contagious disease that unless eliminated would infect a city spreading deterioration and poverty.
The discourse of blight eventually reached the courts, and property rights were redefined when
the courts interpreted slum clearance as a legitimate “public use.” Even the United States
Supreme Court considered the clearing of slums to eliminate blight a “public use” within the
meaning of the 5th Amendment’s Takings Clause. In Berman v. Parker, Justice Douglas
defended the use of eminent domain to remove blight.
Miserable and disreputable housing conditions may do more than spread disease and crime and
immorality. They may also suffocate the spirit by reducing the people who live there to the status
of cattle. They may indeed make living an almost insufferable burden. They may also be an ugly
sore, a blight on the community which robs it of charm, which makes it a place from which men
turn. The misery of housing may despoil a community as an open sewer may ruin a river.8

Blight, according to urban renewal advocates, threatened not only the communities that it
touched, but also the spirit of poor communities. In Berman v. Parker, the Supreme Court
legitimized a 19th century policy that displaces, but does not remedy, poverty. Furthermore, the
Supreme Court greatly expanded government condemnation authority to the detriment of private
property rights. As one commentator put it, slum clearance significantly diminished one stick in
the proverbial bundle of property rights, namely, the right to undisturbed possession. 9
Maryland was no exception to the nation-wide slum clearance movement. As blight was
most prevalent in Maryland’s densely populated urban areas, such as Baltimore City, Maryland’s
General Assembly amended its constitution to deal with urban blight. By amending the
Maryland constitution in 1913, the General Assembly entitled Baltimore City an expedited
process for condemning land within its city lines. Article III, Section 40A of Maryland’s
constitution provided a quick-take exception for properties within Baltimore’s city lines.

8

Berman v. Parker, 248 U.S. 26 (1954), see also Power, supra, at 60-61.
See Wendell E. Pritchett, The “Public Menace” of Blight: Urban Renewal and the Private Uses of Eminent
Domain, 21 Yale L. & Pol’y Rev. 1, 3 (2003).

9
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The General Assembly shall enact no law authorizing private property to be taken for public use
without just compensation, to be agreed upon between the parties or awarded by a jury, being first
paid or tendered to the party entitled to such compensation, but where such property is situated in
Baltimore City and is desired by this State or by the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, the
General Assembly may provide for the appointment of appraisers by a Court of Record to value
such property, and that, upon payment of the amount of such valuation, to the party entitled to
compensation, or into Court and securing the payment of any further sum that may be awarded by
a jury, such property may be taken.10

Pursuant to Article III, Section 40A, landowners could have their property taken away
from them without the safeguard of a trial by jury. Under Section 40A, government may
take rightful possession of private property in Baltimore by simply appraising the value
of the property and depositing that sum into a court. By emasculating the traditional due
process proceedings for eminent domain condemnations, Maryland’s General Assembly
aggrandized its and Baltimore’s power to take property in Baltimore City.
In 1943, Maryland expanded “public use” yet again. By adding Article XI-B by
constitutional amendment, the General Assembly further strengthened Maryland’s and Baltimore
City’s authority to condemn property within Baltimore’s city lines. Unlike Article III Section
40, Article XI-B makes no mention of “public use,” but rather empowers local government to
take private property for “development or redevelopment.”
The General Assembly of Maryland, by public local law, may authorize and empower the Mayor
and City Council of Baltimore…to acquire, within the boundary lines of Baltimore City, land and
property of every kind, and any right, interest, franchise, easement or privilege therein, by
purchase, lease, gift, condemnation or any other legal means, for development or redevelopment,
11
including, but not limited to, the comprehensive renovation or rehabilitation thereof…

Article XI-B of Maryland’s constitution effectively wrote equated economic development with
“pubic use” within the city lines of Baltimore City. After 1943, property of every kind in
Baltimore became subject to the development or redevelopment plans of government.
10

MD. CONS. Art. III, § 40A. (amended 1913); see also ALFRED S. NILES, MARYLAND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 192
(Hepbron & Haydon Law-Book Sellers, Baltimore, Md.)
11
Md. Cons. Art. XI-B § 1 (amended 1943); see also, Youngstown Cartage Co. v. North Point Peninsula
Community Co-ordinating Council, 24 Md. App. 624, 332 A.2d 718 (1975) (Held that a taking under Article XI-B §
1 is constitutional only if the purpose of the taking is for the “public benefit” that suggests that Article XI-B § 1 is a
broader enabling constitutional provision than Article III Section 40 because “public benefit” is broader than “public
use.”)
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This broad sweeping authority did not go to waste. In 1949, the Baltimore
Redevelopment Corporation had been created pursuant to Article XI-B for the purpose of
redeveloping Baltimore’s slums. In 1953, the City’s condemnation authority under Article XI-B
was challenged as not furthering a “public use” but was ultimately upheld by the Court in
Harzinger v. City of Baltimore.12

In 1964, the Court revisited the constitutionality of Article

XI-B in Master Royalties v. Baltimore City. In that case, the Court upheld the constitutionality
of Article XI-B by holding that XI-B embodied a broad concept of “public use” which enabled
government to acquire blighted property for redevelopment.13 The Master Royalties Court,
moreover, found additional justification of its expansive view of “public use” in the Supreme
Court’s landmark decision, Berman v. Parker.
In the 20th century, blight became a new device for Maryland’s government to
constitutionally take private property. No longer limited to condemning property for the public
uses of providing public works, or their functional equivalents (i.e., private railroads), Maryland
could also used its condemning authority to clear slums and blighted areas. This extension,
however, can hardly be surprising in light of the Court’s traditionally deferential construction of
“public use.”
D. DOES PUBLIC USE EXTEND TO ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN ALL OF MARYLAND?
To summarize, Article XI-B empowers the General Assembly and Baltimore to condemn
property in Baltimore for redevelopment (i.e., to remove blight). The constitutionality of Article
XI-B was upheld by the Court in Marchant v. Baltimore. Article XI-B, however, is limited to
condemnations in Baltimore. Maryland’s authority to condemn property outside of Baltimore is
limited by Article III Section 40. Is such a distinction between Baltimore and the rest of

12
13

Herzinger v. Baltimore, 203 Md. 49, 59 (1953).
Master Royalties Corp. v. Baltimore, 235 Md. 74, 84 (1964).
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Maryland constitutional? Does Article III Section 40 of Maryland’s Constitution provide
Maryland with authority to condemn land for economic development?
As argued above, Article III has always been liberally interpreted by Maryland’s courts.
“Public use,” for example, has not been held to literally require public access to the condemned
property. Nor does “public use” forbid government from benefiting a new private party to the
detriment of the former property owner. As long as the public benefit incident to the taking
predominates, Article III’s “public use” requirement will likely be met in Maryland’s courts.
Does “public use,” however, extend to government condemnations of property purely for
economic development? In Prince George’s County v. Collington Crossroads (“Collington”),
the Maryland Court of Appeals faced this very question.
III. WHETHER CONDEMNING LAND FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF AN INDUSTRIAL PARK
CONSTITUTES THE REQUISITE “PUBLIC USE” SO AS TO JUSTIFY THE TAKING?
Under Ch. 689 of the General Assembly’s 1968 session laws, Prince George’s County
(“the County), Maryland gained authority to condemn land for the construction of certain “public
airport facilities and industrial parks.”14 The General Assembly had found the development
necessary to generate opportunities for local employment and to increase the County’s taxable
base.15 The Generally Assembly maintained, moreover, that its enabling legislation had the

14

1968 Md. Acts, Ch. 689, § 1(b) (“The term ‘industrial parks” shall mean (i) the acquisition, by any legal means, of
land or property in Prince George’s County generally in the southwest quadrant of the intersection of Maryland
Route 214 and U.S. Route 301 in one contiguous tract as now determined by the County to be suitable as the site or
sites for the establishment of one or more industrial parks to encourage and promote the creation of new industry
and the growth of existing industry in Prince George’s County and (ii) the grading of such site or sites, the tracks
and taxiways, the construction and equipment of buildings, the construction and installation of all utility services
and the doing of any and all things necessary in connection with or pertaining to the acquisition and development of
such land or property as industrial sites including but not limited to the architectural and engineering services
incident thereto.”); Prince Georges County, 275 Md. at 172-173.
15
Id. § 10(c) (“….[T]he County Commissioners for Prince George’s County by the acquisition of potential
industrial lands may directly solicit industrial users of said land thereby affording the creation of employment
opportunities for the residents of Prince George’s County, the diversification and increase of the taxable base
available to said County so as not to depend in too large a degree upon one segment of the economy….”); Prince
George’s County, 275 Md. at 172.
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single object of preserving and improving the economic well-being of Prince George’s County
residents.16
On August 22, 1968, Prince Georges County commenced condemnation actions in order
to make way for an airport. Given that Maryland’s precedents had consistently upheld takings of
private land for highway and railroad expansion, the County’s initial Airport proposal was not
very controversial, at least from a legal perspective. After all, an airport is a form of
transportation and thus the logical extension of a highway or a railroad. Although the issue had
not been litigated, the County’s airport proposal would likely have passed the test of “public use”
under Maryland law.
Against the current of the law, citizens of Bowie, Maryland, nonetheless, vigorously
opposed the County’s airport project. They feared that the excess noise and pollution incident to
an airport would reduce property values in the area. From 1968-1975, Bowie vehemently
opposed the County’s condemnation efforts. These controversies bounced back and forth
between Prince George’s County Circuit Court and the Maryland Court of Appeals. The
Collington controversy had reached the Maryland Court of Appeals five times in seven years.
A. THE CITY OF BOWIE V. COUNTY COM’RS FOR PRINCE GEORGE’S CO., 262 A.2D 172 (1970)
Pursuant to Ch. 689, the County issued and sold bonds to private investors to finance its
airpark condemnations. In June of 1969, Bowie filed suit in the Circuit Court for Prince
George’s County to have the bonds declared invalid on grounds that they had been illegally
issued.17 The City argued that the County had neither given notice of their proposal nor held a
public hearing prior to adopting its resolution. In turn, the County denied its responsibility to

16

Id. § 10(d). (“….[T]he acquisition of potential industrial lands and construction of industrial facilities has the
single object of preserving and improving the economic well-being of the residents of Prince George’s County, and
is found and determined to be in the public interest.”); Prince George’s County, 275 Md. at 173.
17
The City of Bowie v. Board of County Comm’rs I, 262 A.2d 172 (1970)
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give notice or provide for a public hearing on grounds that its proposal constituted an
“emergency measure.” 18 Such a measure, according to the County, was exempt from the usual
notice and hearing requirements typically required.
The circuit court found, but on different grounds, that the County had no obligation to
notify the public of its action. Skirting the issue of whether building a public airport constituted
an “emergency measure,” the court held that the County had acted “executively” by selling
bonds to finance its airport project, and therefore had not been required to provide notice of its
action.19 On June 5, 1970, the Maryland Court of Appeals affirmed.
A. CITY OF BOWIE V. BOARD OF COUNTY COM’RS, 271 A.2D 657 (1970)
Later that year, the City of Bowie again brought suit against the County on different
grounds. On this occasion, the City asked the court to grant an injunction on the airpark project
on a theory of anticipatory nuisance. The City feared that the airport would “emit unusual,
unreasonable, and unnecessary noise, vibration, dust, stench and filth…creating danger, fear,
hurt, and inconvenience” to the people of Bowie.20 The City further claimed that the airport
project quite simply was not a good idea and was doomed to end in “financial catastrophe.”21
Circuit Judge Ralph Powers upheld the County’s petition for condemnation on two
grounds. Finding the City’s new claim of anticipatory nuisance unpersuasive, Circuit Judge
Ralph Powers first held that the allegations of noise, vibration, and stench were not supported by
evidence great enough to justify an injunction against a project backed by the County
government.22 Judge Powers also rejected the City’s claim of “financial catastrophe.”
According to Judge Powers, it is not the province of the judiciary to “review the wisdom of
18

Id.
Id.
20
The City of Bowie v. Board of County Comm’rs II, 271 A.2d 657, 658 (1970).
21
Id. at 660.
22
Id.
19
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projects which elected bodies undertake, nor can courts substitute their judgment for the
judgment of the people in authority who make the decisions.”23 On appeal, Judge McWilliams
of Maryland’s Court of appeals affirmed Judge Powers’s opinion in its entirety.
B. GENERAL ASSEMBLY REPEALS CH. 689
Given the strong opposition to the County’s proposed airport, Maryland’s General
Assembly had second thoughts regarding the County’s condemnation authority. In 1971, the
Maryland General Assembly repealed the County’s authority to condemn the disputed property
“generally in the southwest quadrant of the intersection of Maryland Route 214 and U.S. Route
301,” but authorized the County to condemn “any other site within Prince George’s County
provided adequate safeguards…to limit the noise, safety and nuisance hazards imposed on the
residents of the immediate area…and the impact of the project on the local environment.”24
In turn, the County challenged the validity of Chapter 6. Prince George’s County Circuit
Court held that the General Assembly’s 1971 Chapter 6 session law was voided because the
County had already invested considerably in its proposed airpark when relying on Chapter 689 of
the General Assembly’s 1968 session laws.25 With the judiciary’s support, the County executive
issued executive order “No. 72-1971,” reaffirming the County’s interest in the property bound to
the north by Route 214 and to the East by U.S. Route 301.
After three years of administrative and legal delay, the County executive had revised its
original condemnation plans. On this occasion, the County sought to build an industrial park
instead of an airport. This change in position incited even more opposition, but this time from the
County’s legislative branch. On May 18, 1971, the Prince George’s County Council passed 10

23

Id.
1971 Md. Acts, Ch. 6.
25
See Opinion of Ralph W. Powers, C. J., Prince George’s County v. Caulfield, No. 47, 357 (Md. 7th Cir. Ct. 1971)
(affirmed).
24
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votes to 1 Councilman White’s bill No. 19-1971 (“White bill”) which revoked the County’s
authority to condemn land for the purposes of the airpark, declared the land already acquired
surplus property, and directed the County Executive to sell the land as expeditiously as
possible.26 Despite almost unanimous disapproval of the industrial park proposal, the County
Executive ignored the Council’s bill and on September 21, 1971 issued an order to condemn land
exclusively for the development of an industrial park and to amend any pleadings in any pending
cases to reflect the new executive directive.27
The County’s new industrial park proposal raised constitutional issues not implicated in
the previous litigation. By abandoning the airport project for an industrial park development, the
County effectively raised the question of whether it had the constitutional authority to condemn
private property for the purposes of economic development. The former airpark proposal,
although vigorously opposed, did not implicate Maryland’s takings clause because Maryland’s
courts had consistently upheld government condemnations of private land to make way for
public works, such as roads and highways, to further transportation and commerce. Moreover,
the courts had consistently upheld condemnations for private railroads on the logic that railroads
are the functional equivalent of roads and highways. While taking property for airport
development was not constitutionally controversial, taking property for the sole purpose of
industrial development raised significant constitutional “public use” issues.
C. WITH THE CONDEMNATION OF PRIVATE PROPERTY FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT,
COLLINGTON CROSSROADS SEEKS FOREIGN HELP
The County’s new industrial park proposal raised the constitutional issue of what
constitutes “public use.” Toby Prince Brigham, a fiery eminent domain lawyer hailing from

26

See Opinion by Judge Parker, Board of County Comm’rs v. Collington Crossroads, Inc., No. 37.944 (Md. 7th Cir.
Ct 1972) (reversed); see also (p. 499 of PDF 1.)
27
Prince Georges County v. Beard, 266 Md. 83, 86 (1972).
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Miami, Florida, served as counsel for Collington Crossroads, Inc. Eminent domain ran through
Mr. Brigham’s blood. Brigham’s father, E.F.P. Brigham was an eminent domain lawyer of
prominence who had convinced the Florida Supreme Court that government is required to pay
for the defendant’s expert testimony in government land acquisition cases.28 Toby Prince
Brigham followed his father’s footsteps. Since Collington, Mr. Brigham has earned the
reputation as Florida’s top eminent domain lawyer. Fighting passionately for forty years on
behalf of private landowners across the country, Brigham is referred to as “a preacher of the
gospel of property rights.”29 Brigham himself styles his livelihood as a “cause of freedom” to
protect civil liberties and prevent government from becoming “totalitarian.”30 Collington
Crossroads, Inc. was likely one of Brigham’s earliest clients.

Toby Prince Brigham, Esq.
Source: Brigham Moore,
LLP, Brigham recognized in
the 2005-2006 edition of The
Best Lawyers in America ®,
http://www.eminentdomain.c
om

Mr. Brigham vigorously opposed the County’s motion to amend its condemnation
petition on grounds that using eminent domain to build an “industrial park” is an unconstitutional

28

Robert P. King, The Lawyer, PALM BEACH POST, February 23, 2003, at sec. A.
Id.
30
Id.
29
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taking of private party for “private use.”31 Moving to dismiss the County’s motion, Mr. Brigham
argued that the County’s amended petition to condemn land was “unconstitutionally
impermissible on its face as an attempt to acquire private property for a purely private purpose”
in violation of Maryland and Federal constitution.32
Collington’s motion to dismiss again reached the chambers of Judge Ralph W. Powers.
Persuaded by Mr. Brigham, Judge Powers dismissed the County’s motion to amend its
condemnation petition without, however, reaching the question of whether an industrial park
constitutes a “public use.” On the facts of the case, Judge Powers did not need to. The court
disposed of the case on grounds that the County Council had already unequivocally abandoned
the project by passing the White bill which extinguished the County Executive’s condemnation
authority.
I must conclude that the clear intent of the Council to abandon the public airport and industrial
park project by the enactment of Bill No. 19-1971 cannot be circumvented by any interpretation of
these sections or an Executive Order. The original legislation declared this project to be for public
purposes. Subsequent legislation declared the project abandoned and the land acquired surplus
property. There is no legal authority by which the acquisition of additional land by condemnation
can meet the requirement that it be for public use.33

The County again appealed, and the Court of Appeals granted certiorari. Four years of
vigorous opposition did not seem to discourage the County Executive. In fact, the County
seemed more eager than ever to push its condemnation project through. Without waiting for the
Court of Appeals to decide its appeal, and thus, not knowing whether it in fact retained the
authority to condemn, the County nonetheless zealously pursued its condemnation efforts.
Unsure of its condemnation authority, the County again asked the court to amend its
condemnation pleadings to incorporate its change in “public use” from an airpark to an industrial
park development.
31

Prince Georges County v. Beard, 266 Md. 83, 86 (1972) (quoting Judge Powers’ opinion).
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On March 3, 1972, Judge Roscoe Parker, then presiding over the case, dismissed the
County’s motion to amend its condemnation petition with prejudice. Judge Parker held that the
County Council’s “White bill” effectively extinguished the County’s condemnation authority,
and thus, rendered moot the County’s motion to amend.34 The County appealed and the Court of
Appeals again accepted review. The Court of Appeals was, therefore, presiding over two
identical, or nearly identical, causes.
E. PRINCE GEORGE’S COUNTY V. BEARD, 291 A.2D 636 (JUNE 13, 1972).
The first appeal reached Maryland’s highest court in 1972. In Prince George’s County v.
Beard, 291 A.2d 636 (June 13, 1972), the appeal from Judge Ralph W. Powers’s opinion, the
Court of Appeals faced two issues: (1) whether the County Council may effectively override an
executive project that had been voted into the County’s budget at popular referendum; (2) and
whether the County has the power to condemn private property for a publicly owned and
operated industrial park leased, in major part, to private industrial and commercial interests.
The Court of Appeals reversed the circuit court on the first issue taking the position that a
capital project signed into the county charter could only be abandoned if (1) the County
Executive recommended such an abandonment; (2) a public hearing is provided; and (3) the
County Council approved the abandonment by two-thirds of its members. The Court, therefore,
struck the “White bill” as an ineffective override of a capital venture already signed into the
County’s charter.
Again, however, the Court did not reach issue of whether the County may
constitutionally condemn private property for the development of an industrial park on grounds
that the record had not been sufficiently developed to the extent that the question of “public use”

34

See Opinion: Judge Parker, Board of County Commissioners for Prince George’s County v. collington
Crossroads, Inc., Law No. 37.944 (Mar 3, 1972). (p. 499)
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could be answered. The Court, without either reversing or affirming, remanded the case to
provide the County with more time to amend its development plans so that the lower court might
have more information on which to base its decision.35 The Court further provided guidance to
the County by referencing Marchant v. Baltimore, 146 Md. 513, 521 (1924), a case in which
Baltimore City’s eminent domain power was upheld by the court on grounds that the City had
developed a comprehensive plan that ensured commercial growth. It seemed as if the Maryland
Court of Appeals provided the County with a template on how to make their proposals
constitutional.36
F. “ONE MAY EXPRESS THE HOPE THAT THE LITIGATION EMANATING FROM THIS BATTLE
WILL NOT CONTINUE AS LONG AS THE HUNDRED YEARS’ WAR OR, PERHAPS, THE
WARS OF THE ROSES…”37
The second appeal that had been pending review was decided the following year. In this
case, the County had appealed Judge Parker’s refusal to grant the County leave to amend its
condemnation petition. Presiding over the Collington controversy for now the fourth occasion,
the Court of Appeals’ discontent was manifest.
We suspect that as a result of our rulings in Beard and in this case yet other cases arising from this
proposed project will reach us. One may express the hope that the litigation emanating from this
battle will not continue as long as the Hundred Years’ War or, perhaps, the Wars of the Roses
which it resembles in some respects since one may draw the inference that this series of cases arise
in part from a tussle for power and not simply from the never ending conflict between property
owners and their government when property is to be taken for public purposes.38

35

Id.
But see, Beard, 266 Md. at 95 (“Inevitably, inferences would be drawn from such comment as to whether we
might or might not regard a proposed industrial park as constitutionally permissible when in fact we could make no
such determination until full and complete facts were before us. The County is proposing condemnation when the
record before us shows that even the County Executive is unable to say what use will be made of the property. For
us to hold on such a record that a public use has been established would be to hold, in essence, that a public body
may condemn private property for any purpose which suits its convenience which, to paraphrase Judge Alvey’s
comment in New Central Coal Co., would make the rights of property solely dependent upon the will of a legislative
body, without restraint. Such is not the law.”
37
Prince George’s County v. Collington Crossroads, Inc., 268 Md. 69 (Feb. 7, 1973).
38
Id. at 71.
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Notwithstanding the Court’s decision in Beard, which could have been used to control the
outcome of this case, the Court of Appeals took care to emphasize its directive on remand.
The Court of Appeals, moreover, seemed to scold the trial court for its quick trigger in
dismissing the County’s motion to amend its condemnation petition. Citing a 19th century
precedent, the court reminded the lower court of stare decisis.
We are bound to decide according to existing laws, even though a judgment, rightful when
rendered by the court below, should be reversed as a consequence.39

Clearly, the Court of Appeals was unhappy with the lower court for not waiting for Beard to be
decided before reaching another opinion on the County’s motion to amend. The implications of
the Court’s reprimand of Judge Parker were perhaps even more serious. On remand, Judge
Parker recused himself from the controversy because he owned property within the County’s
proposed taking lines.40
Reversing the trial court, the Court of Appeals held that leave to amend must be granted
to the County, but again did not decide whether the County’s proposal fell within a “public use”
on grounds that the record had not been sufficiently developed. The Court, however, did require
that the County either perfect its plan expeditiously or dismiss its efforts.
The property owner is entitled to have the sword of Damocles suspended over its head in the
nature of this condemnation proceeding removed by trial at an early date.41

IV. PRINCE GEORGE’S COUNTY, PROVIDED A COMPREHENSIVE PLAN AND JUST
COMPENSATION, MAY CONSTITUTIONALLY CONDEMN PRIVATE PROPERTY FOR THE
DEVELOPMENT OF AN INDUSTRIAL PARK
A. ON THE FACTS, JUDGE RALPH POWERS HELD THAT THE COUNTY’S INDUSTRIAL PARK
PROPOSAL DID NOT CONSTITUTE A “PUBLIC USE.”

39

Id. at 75; quoting Day v. Day, 22 Md. 530 (1865).
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41
Collington Crossroads, Inc., 268 Md. at 77.
40

-18-

Pursuant to the Court’s order in Beard, Prince George’s County prepared a
comprehensive plan of its proposed industrial park development. The County hired Dr. David
Wallace, an expert planner, to head the County’s industrial park task force. The task force’s
development plan included dividing the 1,200 acre development into categories of desired uses
including commercial recreation, research office buildings, manufacturing/wholesale sites, and
manufacturing offices. The plan further provided for open space areas including a golf course,
flood plain, and other areas that would not be developed to preserve the handsome attributes of
the property.42 The County, moreover, claimed that it would overlook the industrial park
development at every stage. The comprehensive plan was to be executed over a projected
duration of 20 years.43
With Judge Parker removed from the case, the Collington controversy again reached the
chambers of Judge Ralph Powers on April 8, 1974. Judge Ralph W. Powers sat as Chief Judge
of the 7th Judicial Circuit of Maryland from 1971 to 1976.44 He was known to have been an
efficient no-nonsense judge. Having served in the army in World War II, Judge Powers
administered his courtroom with exacting military precision. Judge James P. Salmon, who had
practiced before Judge Powers as a lawyer, shared memories of Judge Powers with the Baltimore
Sun.
When you came into his courtroom, you had better be prepared. I remember a young lawyer who
asked that a trial be postponed because his wife was expecting their first child that day. Judge
Powers advised him that first babies are often late and the trial was going forward. The baby was
born several days later.45

Ralph Powers was the quintessential circuit court judge. Opposed to dilly dally, Judge Powers
quickly got to the heart of issues. A lawyer who had once argued before Judge Powers esteemed
42
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him as “everything you wanted in a Circuit Court Judge,” adding that he could “conduct a nonjury trial faster than anyone.”46
Accustomed to resolving controversies expeditiously from the bench, Judge Powers
seemed disappointed when called to again preside over this long drawn-out tussle for power.
During the trial on April 8, 1973, Judge Powers made clear to the litigants, and particularly the
County, that he was indeed a no-nonsense Judge. At trial, Judge Powers made clear that he was
skeptical of the legitimacy of the County’s efforts to condemn Collington’s property when he
said:
The Beard case I sat on before. It was heard on the question of the constitutionality of the taking.
At that time, as I recall, they had if not formally abandoned the airpark aspect of this project there
were strong indications that it was to be abandoned. They had no plan as to how they were going
to proceed, other than the terminology an industrial park. They didn’t have any limitations on the
land involved. And, for all anybody knew, they could have, if permitted to do so, they could have
condemned a couple of thousand of acres and then put it up for sale under sealed bids for the
highest bidder and hopefully make themselves some money. If they didn’t get a big enough bid,
they could wait a couple of years and try it again. Obviously unconstitutional and improper.47

(Emphasis provided).
Judge Powers also seemed disappointed in the Maryland Court of Appeals.
Faithful to his no-nonsense reputation, Judge Powers openly criticized the Court of
Appeals for remanding the previous cases and not simply affirming the decision to reject
what had been very sloppy, if not down right unconstitutional, efforts to condemn private
land.
…[I]n any event, the ruling was, at that time in the Beard case, that they did not have a sufficient
plan. There was some discussion among the Judges and condemnation lawyers and others when
the case came down instead of affirming or reversing. They simply remanded to give the County a
further opportunity for plans, instead, as some might have believed, of affirming because there
was no plan, because they clearly said there wasn’t a plan and there had to be one before they had
the right to condemn.,…,Is that a correct statement?48
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At trial, Judge Powers found even more reasons to suspect the County’s industrial park
proposal. He was particularly concerned with the County’s plan to sell most of the acquired
land, if not all of it, to private developers, thereby losing the public oversight requisite to satisfy
“public use.” Mr. Brigham brought this controversial aspect of the County’s plan to the court
while cross-examining Dr. Wallace.
MR. BRIGHAM: So basically the plan here is to acquire the private property which is sought in (p.
83) this case and plan it for development and sell it off to private users for a profit?
THE WITNESS [DR. WALLACE]: Correct
THE COURT: Will it all ultimately be sold?
THE WITNESS: I believe it would all ultimately be sold, except for land held as public rights-ofway or as public open spaces.
THE COURT: Even golf courses?
THE WITNESS: The expectation would be the golf course would ultimately be a commercial
venture.49

Judge Powers’s initial concern that the County would have take land and sell it to the
highest bidder to turn a profit did not seem to change even after the County introduced its
comprehensive plan.
However, the facts had changed. Pursuant to the Court of Appeal’s directive, the
County developed a comprehensive plan on which to proceed with its condemnation
efforts. It appointed a 15-member industrial park taskforce. Unlike the County’s
previous half-baked condemnation proposals, its newest comprehensive plan carried the
weight of experienced urban planners with doctorates. Judge Powers had hoped on
deciding this case from the bench, but could not because the County had finally given
him something to think about.
I was hoping that I could decide this case if not right from the bench when argument was
concluded at least after a brief recess. But I am afraid I would have to go into it more
comprehensively than that and I will have to take it under advisement…. / …I don’t [however]
49

Id.
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have any other cases under advisement at the present time. I can get to this without any delay and
get it decided within the next few days.50

On May 23, 1974, Judge Powers decided on the constitutionality of the industrial park
proposal. On the facts, Judge Powers found that the industrial park proposal was
unconstitutional. He was convinced that the “public use” limitation to eminent domain
condemnations prevented the County from taking private land for its proposed industrial park,
which according to Judge Powers, was a private venture. After all, virtually all of the
condemned land would be turned over to private hands.
The final result would be to leave no more land for public use then the usual residue after a private
developer has fully exploited such a project as this. Of interest, if not significance, is that at the
final wind up of this project the estimated profit to the County is $14,031,800.51

In dicta, Judge Powers explained his holding of unconstitutionality on Maryland’s
public/private distinction. Judge Powers conceded that some states read “public use” to really
mean “public benefit,” but was convinced that Maryland interpreted “public use” more strictly.
Judge Powers, moreover, was convinced that a strict reading of “public use” was superior to a
broad reading. According to him, a broad reading of “public use” was not judicially workable as
it did not afford a definite criterion on which judges could decide cases. Under a broad reading
of “public use,” Judge Powers feared that the judiciary would imprudently be “left free to
indulge their own views of public utility or advantage.”52 Citing Henry Niles’ influential work,
Maryland Constitutional Law, Judge Powers argued that Maryland reads “public use” strictly.
(1) It is the primary and more commonly understood meaning of the words. (2) At the time of the
adoption of the second Constitution of 1851, the first of our organic instruments to contain a
limitation upon the power of eminent domain, as well as the third Constitution of 1865, and our
present Constitution of 1867, there was no practice in Maryland showing a contemporaneous

50
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construction that the term “public use” imported public benefit. (3) Our definition furnishes a
more definite guide for the courts.53

On the facts and the law, Judge Powers held the County’s industrial park condemnation
unconstitutional. Judge Powers did not contest that the County’s purpose might have very well
furthered a public interest. Judge Powers held only that the County’s proposed condemnation
could not survive the strict constitutional provision that property can only be taken for public
use.54 Despite being remanded back on several occasions by the Court of Appeals, Judge Powers
stood resolute in what he believed, on the facts and the law, was an unconstitutional exercise of
eminent domain.

The County again sought review, now for the fifth time, in the Court of

Appeals.
B. ON THE LAW, JUDGE JOHN C. ELDRIDGE REVERSES THE CIRCUIT COURT.
The following year, Maryland’s Court of Appeals accepted the County’s petition for
review, its fifth review of the Collington controversy. Judge John C. Eldridge presided over the
case. Only 40 years old when appointed to the bench by Governor Marvin Mandel in 1974,
Judge Eldridge remained an associate justice on the Maryland Court of Appeals until he turned
70 years-old and was required by Maryland law to step down.55 During his 30-year tenure on the
Court of Appeals, Judge Eldridge developed an impressive track record that includes writing
many of Maryland’s landmark opinions. Writing for the court, Judge Eldridge struck
Maryland’s juvenile curfew laws, subjected the governor’s phone and office appointment records
to public scrutiny, and declared unconstitutional the exclusion of whites from juries on grounds

53
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of race.56 Most recently, Judge Eldridge authored an opinion that invalidated Maryland’s twotiered election system of qualifying for ballots, thereby, increasing minority parties’ chances of
reaching the ballot boxes.57 Former Governor Mandel speaks of Eldridge as having “one of the
brightest legal minds” he has ever known and quickly points to Eldridge’s impressive career as
evidence.58

Judge John C. Eldridge
Source: Maryland State
Archives,
http://www.mdarchives.state.
md.us

Judge Eldridge’s appointment to the Court, however, was as controversial as his career
was successful. Appointed to Maryland’s highest court at a youthful 40, Judge Eldridge endured
much disapproval at the outset. For example, the Anne Arundel County bar publicly denounced
Eldridge’s appointment as political cronyism.59 Eldridge’s controversial appointment also stirred
trouble within Maryland’s highest bench. Protesting Eldridge’s appointment, Judge Wilson K.
Barnes Sr. of the Court of Appeals resigned from the bench.60 Suspicions of cronyism cast upon
Judge Eldridge’s appointment were perhaps well-founded. Judge Eldridge, after all, served as
Governor Mandel’s chief legislative officer prior to serving the Court of Appeals.
56
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Mandel’s administration was a formidable machine that, quite simply, got things done.
Under Mandel’s leadership, the 1968 Constitutional Convention’s draft constitution, almost
universally touted as exemplary but ultimately rejected at popular referendum, became law
through statute and constitutional amendment. In furtherance of this massive reform, Governor
Mandel created Maryland’s first Office of Legislation. John C. Eldridge was appointed Chief
Legislative Officer. Eldridge, with a staff of forty lawyers under him, drafted agency plans into
bills for the General Assembly to sign into law.61
In his capacity as Chief Legislative Officer, John C. Eldridge, to say the least, kept busy.
The 1969 and 1970 legislative sessions were high points of government activism that had been
escalating throughout the 1960’s.62 In 1970, Mandel’s administration established the Nation’s
first complete executive cabinet system.63 248 executive agencies were consolidated into 12
major departments headed by cabinet-level secretaries who reported directly to the Governor.
Reform was not, however, limited to the executive branch. The young constituency of
Maryland’s legislature, many of whom were first-time elects, acknowledged their inexperience
and demanded a robust bureaucracy to get them on their feet.64 Full-time staff increased from 12
in 1966 to 119 in 1969. The legislative branch’s operating budget rose from $675,000 in 1960 to
$3,900,000 in 1970.65
Keeping pace with the growth of bureaucracy, the courts grew as well. Judges were
given a staff of clerks to research the law. Maryland’s new and robust judiciary consisted of 180
judges and more than 1,500 employees.66 1970, the General Assembly passed the Office of
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Legislation’s bill that reorganized Maryland’s ailing judicial system into a neatly organized fourtier system, reminiscent of the system that the 1967-68 Constitutional Convention had in mind.67
Local magistrate judges, many of whom were not even lawyers but earned their posts through
political favor, were replaced by the newly established district judges.68 Circuit courts reviewed
the districts and the Court of Special Appeals and the Court of Appeals reviewed the Circuits.
The Court of Appeals, moreover, gained administrative authority over its inferior courts. For the
first time, the Court of Appeals could, provided a recommendation for removal from the newly
created judicial disabilities commission and a hearing, remove lower court judges from the
bench. 69 Under Mandel’s leadership, Maryland’s three governmental branches underwent
revolutionary expansion. As George Calcott put it,
…more than ever before or since, people seemed to look to government to provide the kind of
society they wanted, and they looked to Mandel more than people had looked to any governor in
Maryland history to bring it about.70

67
68
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Id. at 229.
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V. PRINCE GEORGES COUNTY V. COLLINGTON CROSSROADS, INC., 275 MD. 171 (1975)
Given Judge Eldridge’s pivotal roll in the Mandel Administration that expanded
government to an unprecedented scale, Judge Eldridge was destined to write the opinion that
would ultimately aggrandize government authority to take private property. Presiding over
Collington, Judge Eldridge reversed the lower court finding that the County’s proposed industrial
park passed Article III, Section 40’s “public use” requirement.
Historians are said not to recount “history” per se, but to find historical support for their
respective positions. Judges might very well be the same way.71 In finding that the County’s
proposed industrial park constituted a “public use,” Judge Eldridge relied on precisely the same
precedents used by Judge Powers who had found to the contrary. Relying on those same cases,
Judge Eldridge held that Maryland had always liberally construed “public use” to include
government projects reasonably designed to benefit the general public by significantly enhancing
economic growth.
71
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In Collington, Judge Eldridge relied on Riden v. Philadelphia, previously relied on by
Judge Powers when finding unconstitutionality, to uphold the constitutionality of the County’s
industrial park. Judge Eldridge, like a good historian, cited to portions of the opinion that the
lower court curiously did not use. In Riden, the Court adjudicated the issue of whether a railroad
has the right to condemn land for the purposes of constructing a branch line to a privately-owned
business, the Bowie Race Track. The Riden Court upheld the right to condemn on grounds that
the public would physically have access to the railroad. Despite this narrow holding, the Riden
court, however, made clear that “public use” was not limited to situations where the public could
physically occupy the condemned land. The court, rather, left open a broader interpretation of
“public use” for a case in which such adjudication was appropriate.
But we need to deal now only with the specific question presented by the record at the present
time. Here we are not faced with any difficulty, because it is universally conceded that a common
72
carrier of passengers or freight is a public necessity.

While not drawing any distinct lines for “public use,” the Riden court did, however, make
abundantly clear that the concept of “public use” was subject to change, and that a broad
expansive view may very well benefit the public.
The criticism was made…[t]hat our construction of the words “public use” would enable the State
to condemn property for business enterprises such as hotels and theatres…”But why,” demands
one of the leading authorities on the subject in defense of the Maryland rule, “may not the
Legislature provide for acquiring by condemnation a site for a hotel or theatre to which the public
shall have the right to resort and which shall be subject to public regulation in its management and
charges? Is not this a mere question of expediency and public policy? And is not our opinion
upon this question the outgrowth of the state of society in which we live and the usages and
practices to which we are accustomed? In ancient times vast sums of money were expended in the
construction and maintenance of public theatres, which were regarded as among the most
important of institutions. Some discretion must be left to the Legislature. It is not to be presumed
that they are wholly destitute of integrity or judgment. The people have left it for them to
determine for what public uses private property may be condemned. If they abuse their trust, the
responsibility is not upon the courts, nor the remedy in them.73
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Curiously, the Circuit Court failed to cite to the Riden court’s material qualifications of how it
construed “public use.” The Court of Appeals, on the other hand, used the previously omitted
dicta in Riden to support its argument that Maryland had never narrowly construed “public use.”
Under Riden, the Court made clear that the mere fact that government involvement in new areas
which were formerly the domain of private enterprise did not lead to the conclusion that a
condemnation was for private and not “public use.”74
The Court, moreover, found significant two factors in upholding the constitutionality of
the County’s proposed industrial park. First, the County Executive had found that the industrial
park facility was a type of project which private developers were unable or unwilling to
undertake.75 The County, therefore, was undertaking a project that the private sector could not
have provided. Second, the County would maintain significant control over the industrial park
even after selling it to private developers.76 In light of the County’s findings and Maryland’s
traditionally liberal construction of “public use,” Judge Eldridge, writing for the Maryland Court
of Appeals, held:
Under our cases, projects reasonably designed to benefit the general public, by significantly
enhancing the economic growth of the State or its subdivisions, are public uses, at least where the
exercise of the power of condemnation provides an impetus which private enterprise cannot
provide.77

On remand, Judge Powers awarded $2.5 million to Collington Crossroads, Inc. as just
compensation for the County’s condemnation.78
VI. WAKE OF COLLINGTON CROSSROADS
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A. PRINCE GEORGE’S COUNTY HAS LIMITED SUCCESS IN ATTRACTING INDUSTRY TO
COLLINGTON CENTER
In depositions, Prince George’s County Councilman, John J. Garrity, revealed that part of
the County’s intentions for its industrial park development was to attract quality industry and
avoid new warehouses which were already too prevalent in the County.79 Warehousing,
according to him, is undesirable compared to other industries such as manufacturing and
research/development because it provides relatively fewer jobs and lower pay.80 Desired
industries such as manufacturing, on the other hand, provide more jobs and higher pay and
increase the County’s taxable base. By the 1970’s, Prince George’s County had developed the
reputation of being the “warehouse capital” of Maryland.81 The County government’s industrial
park development plan sought to remedy the County’s “warehousing” reputation.
In the 1970’s, Developers were looking for sizeable parcels of land, surrounded by
compatible uses, that were connected to major networks of transportation, such as highways,
railroads and airports. Collington Center seemed a precise fit for the market demand. Tom
Hutchinson, vice president and project manager for Cabot, Cabot and Forbes, a Boston-based
developer of industrial parks, office and commercial complexes, was one of Collington Center’s
first clients. Collington, moreover, was exactly what Hutchinson was looking for in an industrial
area. 82
Interest in Collington Center, however, was short-lived. After over a decade of hype,
Collington Center’s 1,200-acre plot remained virtually fallow. In 1987, the County had only
successfully enticed eight clients to occupy Collington Center. Many of those businesses,
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moreover, were disappointments. Given the County’s difficulties in luring industry to Collington
Center, the County settled on doing business with many undesirable industry types, such as
warehousing. For example, Unlimited Products moved into Collington Center in 1984. With
County money, Unlimited built two 40,000-squre-foot buildings most of which was devoted
exclusively to warehouse use. This venture flew in the face of the County’s declared policy to
promote desirable industries in manufacturing or research that would provide more jobs and
diversify the County’s taxable base. Other ventures by the County failed to provide jobs for
County residents. Lanman Companies, Inc., a lithographic firm that also settled into Collington
Center in 1984, is an example of that failure. Using $4.5 million of county-backed industrial
development bonds, Lanman established a printing facility. The facility, however, did not
provide the residents of the County with a single local job. Already employing 150 workers,
Lanman did not have any immediate plans to expand its workforce.83
By 1987, Collington Center was largely considered a failure. Twelve years after the
project’s inception, the county’s 1,200-acre development had only attracted eight interested
firms. Many of the County’s zoning strategies – including its 77-acre foreign trade zone – were
particularly targeted as examples of the County’s overall poor developmental planning.84 Critics
of the County’s efforts found the 77-acre foreign trading zone too small to accommodate for
foreign car dealerships, one of the few lucrative industries that would have benefited from such a
duty-free haven. Collington Center’s manager, Donald Spicer, attributed Collington Center’s
failure to the County’s lack of expertise in the land development business.85 Phillip Schwartz, a
former manager of Collington Center, attributed Collington Center’s failure to poor planning and
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poor location. “If we had to do it again,” he noted to the Washington Post, “we would have
located it in another place.”86 Even the local government acknowledged its failure to
successfully develop Collington Center. County Executive, Parris Glendening, spoke of the
industrial park as a disappointment by all assessments.87 By the 1980’s, the enthusiasm for the
County’s comprehensive plan that had carried so much weight in the Collington decision seemed
to have vanished.

Collington Crossroads’ 325
Acres at the SW Corner of
214 and 301 Remains
Barren to this Day.
Source: Google Maps (2007),
http://www.google.com

B. HAS THE COUNTY REALLY FAILED THOUGH?
Despite the clear lack of interest in Collington Center, some officials maintain, and
perhaps with good reason, that the County’s condemnation efforts were largely successful.
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These supporters quickly point to the sharp increase in property value in Collington Center. In
May of 1987, for example, the County sold 24-acres in the area for $2.5 million dollars, the same
price that the county had paid when it had condemned Collington Crossroads, Inc.’s 323-acre
parcel in 1976.88 Viewed in the most favorable light, the County’s industrial park is a success
because it had already recouped its 1975 expenditure of $2.5 million for Collington’s property.
Viewed in the most unfavorable light, however, the County’s sale of property in 1987 compared
to its 1975 purchase of Collington’s property epitomizes the unfairness that underlies eminent
domain. In condemning Collington’s land, the County had forever prevented Collington, the
rightful owner of the disputed property, from sowing the benefits of its land.
Collington Center is divided into three sections: a 600-acre central section, 200-acre
south section, and 400-acre north section, which includes Collington Crossroads, Inc.’s formerly
owned 323-acre parcel of property. Perhaps encouraged by its previous sale of 24-acres of
Collington Center, the County sought, in July of 1987, to sell its 400-acre northern parcel to
private developers. Extrapolating from the county’s 24-acre sale for $2.5 million, the sale of the
400-acre northern parcel would be worth approximately $41.7 million in 1987 dollars. The 2007
value of the 400-acre parcel of land zoned industrial no doubt is worth even more.
In the final analysis, the County has banked on the exponentially increased value that has
accrued to its condemned property. This, however, is hardly a surprise. Owning land, after all,
is rarely ever a losing venture. Taking land for economic development, therefore, presents a
win-win situation for government. If the County succeeds in executing its proposed plan, the
County clearly wins. If the plan fails, the County still wins because the plan’s failure does not
change the fact that the County remains the rightful owner of very valuable land that when sold
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will add sizably to public money. Does this win-win situation behind government takings for
economic development raise questions of fundamental unfairness? Is public land banking a
legitimate public use? Would not such a broad sweeping eminent domain authority discourage
private parties from buying and developing property when government may constitutionally
condemn it for fractions of its real-life market value? During the Collington trial, Toby Prince
Brigham, counsel for defendant, raised these very issues, arguing against both the fairness and
the legitimacy of the County’s condemnation efforts.
C. TOBY PRINCE BRIGHAM HAD ARGUED AGAINST PUBLIC LAND BANKING BEFORE THE
COURT OF APPEALS IN 1975, BUT TO NO AVAIL.
Collington Crossroads, Inc. had purchased the 323-acre parcel south of Route 214 and
west of U.S. Route 301 on September 17, 1965.89 Three years later, and before Collington
Crossroads had the opportunity to develop its property, the County sought to condemn
Collington’s land. In the appellate brief submitted to the Court of Appeals on behalf of
Collington Crossroads, Mr. Brigham reduced the facts to their simplest form.
Prince George’s County, Maryland, with good intention seeks to acquire Appellee’s property,
develop it and resell it for a profit to other private owners. The owner wants to own and develop
its own property. So now the County wants to forcibly take the property under its sovereign
power of eminent domain claiming justification on ground of public benefit or public advantage.90

In his brief, Mr. Brigham also suggested that the real controversy underlying the
County’s taking was not whether an economic development backed by a comprehensive plan
constituted a “public use,” but rather the philosophical question of whether government may
invade the domain of private free-enterprise business.
The real issue seems to be the philosophical question of whether a private owner should profit
from industrial real estate development brought on by public improvement in the course of
progress or whether the public authority should receive such profits.”91
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In the Collington litigation, Mr. Brigham had built a strong case that the County could
have realized its industrial park without condemning Collington’s property but through the
traditional joint-venture between public works and private development. During crossexamination, Mr. Brigham had asked Dr. Wallace whether the County by zoning and building
infrastructure – roads, sewers, etc. – would be able to accomplish its proposed industrial park, to
which, Dr. Wallace responded:
I will answer the question yes, with a considerable amount of qualification, though, because that
particular situation, which is not analogous to the present one, is one in which the public
infrastructure development is kind of incredible and massive, one which includes the airport itself,
includes all kinds of expressways and highways that have been paid for by public monies. And the
consequence has been, if a true benefit cost analysis were done, I would suspect that it has been
solely to the private benefit and the private benefit has been to only the owners of the industrial
park, whereas the costs have been spread very widely on the whole population through taxation.92

The County, therefore, could very well have promoted development of an industrial park through
its police power. Such an approach, however, was undesirable according to Dr. Wallace. He
argued that using the police power instead of eminent domain for industrial development would
solely benefit private developers while unfairly spreading the costs of public works to the public
at large. Isn’t this unfairness merely the other side of the proverbial coin to Collington
Crossroads, Inc.’s cry of unfairness – namely, the unfairness that falls disproportionately upon
the private land owner when government profits immensely by taking his land?
At the heart of eminent domain are these very issues of fundamental fairness. Is it fair for
private property owners to reap the benefits of government improvements, and in this case, a
comprehensive industrial park facility that might only be possible through government agency?
And, on the flip side, is it fair for government to disproportionately burden select private
property owners in order to pass benefits to the public at large? There is no good answer as both
scenarios seem fundamentally unfair. Faced with no good answers, however, Courts must decide
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cases nonetheless. In 1975, the Maryland Court of Appeals was asked choose between two
imperfect outcomes. In making its difficult choice, the Court upheld the constitutionality of the
County’s condemnation.
VII. CONCLUSION
In deciding Prince George’s County v. Collington Crossroads, Inc., the Maryland Court
of Appeals left unanswered questions of fundamental fairness that underlay eminent domain law.
This, however, is not surprising because “public use” does not speak to fairness. Before the
Court of Appeals was the sole issue of whether the County’s industrial park project constituted a
“public use.” After holding that the County’s development was a “public use,” Judge Eldridge
could not have answered any more. Once “public use” was established, the court deferred to the
County’s political branches. Legislatures, after all, are not to be presumed to be “wholly
destitute of integrity or judgment.”93
That fairness is not found in “public use” is evidenced vividly in Maryland’s “public use”
case law. To illustrate, Maryland has long held “public use” to constitute the condemnation of
land to make ways for railroads. These “public uses,” however, are no more fair than the taking
that had occurred in Collington. Whether condemning for railroads or for industrial
development, government nonetheless discriminates against individuals in order to benefit the
whole. In other words, eminent domain takings, regardless of type, force private individuals to
pack their bags and leave their homes. “Public use,” therefore, draws the line between
permissible and impermissible takings; it does not speak to fairness, but to legitimacy.
Although not found within the constitutional limitations of “public use,” fairness is not a
question beyond the province of the judiciary. Fairness lies, rather, in the “just compensation”
clause. Maryland’s Constitution provides:
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The General Assembly shall enact no Law authorizing private property, to be taken for public use,
without just compensation, as agreed upon between the parties, or awarded by a Jury, being first
paid or tendered to the party entitled to such compensation.94

Fairness, therefore, might be met when “just compensation” is tendered to the party entitled to
such compensation. In Collington, fairness probably was not met. In 1987, the County sold 24acres of its condemned land to a private developer for $2.5 million, the same amount it awarded
Collington when taking its 323-acre parcel. In 1987 dollars, Collington Crossroad’s 323-acre
parcel would have been worth $38.5 million. As such, Collington lost out substantially on its
real estate investment. The stark difference between Collington’s actual and potential earning
highlights the unfairness underlying the Collington controversy and eminent domain takings
generally.
That Collington was decided unfairly, however, does not mean that Collington was
decided incorrectly. Legitimacy and fairness, after all, are separate constitutional inquiries.
Consistent with Maryland’s history of broadly interpreting “public use,” Judge Eldridge clarified
“public use” by holding that economic development takings, when backed by comprehensive
legislative deliberation, were constitutional. However, Judge Eldridge but did not, and indeed
could not decide the issue of “just compensation,” which was not an issue before the court. In
the wake of Collington, “just compensation” remains an issue open for judicial interpretation.
Fairness to private property owners, therefore, might still be achieved in Maryland’s next
landmark eminent domain decision.
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